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traits; and in their professions. But how do such heterogeneities lead to social inequalities? 
What are the social mechanisms that underlie this process? These are the questions pursued 
by the DFG Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB)) “From Heterogeneities to 
Inequalities” at Bielefeld University, which was approved by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) as “SFB 882” on May 25, 2011. 
In the social sciences, research on inequality is dispersed across different research fields 
such as education, the labor market, equality, migration, health, or gender. One goal of the 
SFB is to integrate these fields, searching for common mechanisms in the emergence of 
inequality that can be compiled into a typology. More than fifty senior and junior researchers 
and the Bielefeld University Library are involved in the SFB. Along with sociologists, it brings 
together scholars from the Bielefeld University faculties of Business Administration and 
Economics, Educational Science, Health Science, and Law, as well as from the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In 
addition to carrying out research, the SFB is concerned to nurture new academic talent, and 
therefore provides doctoral training in its own integrated Research Training Group. A data 
infrastructure project has also been launched to archive, prepare, and disseminate the data 
gathered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
Research Project B4 “Companies and Inequality: The Synchronic and Diachronic 
Inequality Effects of Temporary Layoffs (Recalls)” 
 
Project B4 studies discontinuous employment in the context of employing organizations and 
households. First, it analyzes how and why flexible employment relationships arise from 
heterogeneous individual and organizational characteristics and preferences. Second, it 
examines the impact of interrupted membership in employing organizations upon inequality 
over time. Thus, different mechanisms that give rise to inequality (exclusion/inclusion, 
hierarchization, exploitation, and opportunity hoarding) are analyzed in more detail using a 
mixed-method design.  
During the initial funding period, the project concentrates on “recalls” that can be 
characterized as discontinuous employment relationships with an interrupted membership in 
the same employing organization, i.e., when employees leave a company and are re-
contracted after some time. Research on labor market flexibility and organizational 
boundaries mainly ignores this longitudinal form of atypical work. Our secondary analysis of 
the Linked Employer-Employee Data from the IAB shows that about 20% of new hires in a 
firm are recalls. Analyzing the German Socio-Economic Panel we additionally find that 10% of 
all people who changed a job during the last year are recalled. The analysis provides new 
insights into flexible work and discontinuous employment, the blurring of organizational 
boundaries, and mechanisms that generate inequality within organizations.  
The mixed-method design combines qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as 
secondary analysis and field research. First, secondary analyses of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and data from the German Institute for Employment Research 
(SIAB, BHP, and LIAB) aim to deliver results on individual and operational determinants of 
recalls and their consequences. Second, expert interviews within companies and a 
combination of narrative and semi-structured interviews with recalled employees are 
conducted to gain further insights into their rationale, appraisals, and practices. Information 
about recalls, individuals, and households included in the SOEP is used to obtain access to 
recalled employees within different contrast groups. A similar strategy is used for the expert 
interviews as sampling is based on information about the firm-specific use of recalls that is 
provided by the IAB’s Establishment History Panel (BHP). The third component is a 
standardized telephone survey of employees that will be linked with information about 
employers in the IAB’s Linked Employer-Employee Dataset (LIAB). This is used to analyze 
the statistical effect of different determinants and outcomes of recalls which have been 
discovered during the qualitative research. 
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Changing Reward Structures:  
(Temporary) Layoffs and Returns on Human Capital 
Edler, Susanne and Hense, Andrea 
 
Abstract:  
In flexibilized labor markets discontinuous employment increases. Nevertheless, a theory-guided 
analysis is missing that explains why wage inequalities vary between employees who were 
recalled, workers who were reemployed by another employer, and employees in continuous 
employment relationships. Following Sørensen (2000), we test his theory of rent production and 
identify rent-seeking reemployment decisions of employers and employees as an inequality-
generating mechanism. We use process-generated administrative data from German social 
security records that covers the time period 1975 to 2008. We were able to show that recalls are 
beneficial for employers because they capture a part of the employees’ composite rent by 
dismissing and recalling them. Employees lose income due to unemployment and never recover 
the income they could have gained if they had not have been dismissed. Nevertheless, employees 
also gain advantages through recalls, because they receive higher post-reemployment wages than 
employees who moved to another employer. This is because former employers provide higher 
returns on tenure and credentials for people who wait for a recall. In contrast, employees who 
were dismissed and reemployed in a new firm suffer higher short-term wage losses than recalled 
employees, but are able to gain long-term income benefits by increasing returns to work 
experience.  
 
Keywords: wage inequalities, rent production, discontinuous employment, human capital, recall 
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How Rent-seeking Reemployment Decisions Generate Wage Inequalities  
The comprehensive research on wage inequalities has delivered many insights into its different 
determinants and mechanisms which explain the emergence of wage differentials. This article will 
contribute to this research by firstly examining discontinuous employment characterized by an 
interrupted membership in the same employing organization. These temporary layoffs of 
employees and their subsequent re-employment by the same employer are also known as recalls. 
The effect of this employment relationship on wages is mainly unexplored, but can provide new 
insights into wage inequalities that occur in flexibilized labor markets by comparing wage 
differentials of employees who were recalled with employees who moved to another employer, 
or stayed in the same employment relationship. Secondly, the article aims to identify the 
underlying mechanisms that explain these wage differentials, and thus to contribute to 
theoretical and empirical research on the causal emergence of wage inequalities. Therefore, the 
research questions of the following analysis are: Do recalls generate wage inequalities as 
compared to employees who remained employed and to employees who found a new employer? 
Which mechanisms and determinants explain these potential wage differentials? 
This theory-guided analysis of wage differentials in flexible labor markets refers to the 
structural distributional mechanism that Sørensen (2000) calls rent production. While monopoly 
rents to credentials are generated by institutionalized social closure in the labor market, 
composite rents to firm-specific human capital are achieved from social closure in firms. The 
hypotheses are derived by considering the rent-seeking activities undertaken by employees and 
employers in order to increase their wages or their profit. Thus, it is assumed that rent-seeking 
employees are only willing to wait for a recall if this increases their rents compared to alternative 
employments. It could be shown that, indeed, employers provide incentives such as higher 
income returns to credentials and tenure that explain higher wages after reemployment for 
people who were recalled. Similarly, recalls are seen as a flexibility strategy of firms that enables 
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them to gain rents. It could be shown that this is achieved by a reduction of labor costs: On the 
one hand, total labor costs are reduced during the time of the temporary layoff. On the other 
hand, the individual wages of reemployed people are reduced due to this layoff compared to the 
income they could have gained if they had not have been dismissed. Thus, rent-seeking 
reemployment decisions of employers and employees explain wage inequalities: Employers 
increase their composite rents by layoffs because laid off employees receive lower wages than 
continuously employed workers. Recalled employees increase their composite and monopoly 
rents from their human capital compared to wages in new jobs. Nevertheless, the most beneficial 
option for employees is continuous employment without unemployment. In sum, rent-seeking is 
seen as a mechanism that generates wage inequalities by changing returns on assets. Thus, this 
theory-guided analysis explains why wages differ for people who were recalled, found another 
employer or stayed employed continuously. The article will start with an overview of empirical 
findings regarding wage differentials. This refers to research on income effects after 
reemployment and influential determinants of wages that can be altered through reemployment. 
This is followed by an explanation of Sørensen’s theory of rent production and the inequality-
generating mechanism of rent-seeking. In section three, hypotheses are derived, and the data 
described in section four is analyzed and discussed in sections five and six.  
 
1. Reemployment and wage differentials  
The research on recalls and our own analyses show that recalls are quantitatively important and 
require further examination (e.g., Feldstein, 1978; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Mavromaras and 
Rudolph, 1995; Mavromaras and Orme, 2004; Fallick, 2007). Our results show that around 16 % of 
all employment relationships started by recalls. There are very few studies investigating the effect 
of recalls on wages. Their findings consistently confirm that dismissed employees who were 
recalled have lower income losses immediately after reemployment than employees who 
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changed employers (Kodrzycki, 2007; Burda and Mertens, 2001; Mavromaras, 2003: 77). 
Additionally, Burda and Mertens (2001) have shown that in Germany, wage losses after dismissals 
are persistent. However when looking at long-term earning consequences, the recall effect fades 
significantly after two years. Kodrzycki (2007) investigates long-term earning consequences in the 
United States comparing wages of workers who got laid off permanently with workers who were 
unexpectedly recalled. Contrary to the findings of Burda and Mertens (2001), her results indicate 
a permanent positive recall effect. Nevertheless, recalled employees still receive lower wages 
than employees who stayed employed continuously (Kodrzycki, 2007).  
Although these studies provide insight into recall effects on wage differentials, none of them 
offer a causal explanation. They neither examine determinants of this recall effect nor do they 
develop a theoretical explanation able to identify the mechanisms that generate these wage 
inequalities. This article attempts to close this gap by referring to rent-seeking reemployment 
decisions that explain the wage differences between recalled employees, employees who moved 
to another employer and employees who remained employed.  
To achieve this, it is important to identify influential determinants for wages which could be 
altered by recalls and reemployment decisions. One of the most important determinants of wages 
is human capital (e.g., Mincer, 1974; Felli and Harris, 1996; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008). 
Human capital comprises educational attainment level (in this article synonymous with 
credentials, formal education), work experience, and tenure (Becker, 1964; Blossfeld, Hannan and 
Schömann, 1988; Bowles, Gintis and Dickerson, 2001). Empirical findings consistently show that 
wages generally increase with increasing credentials, work experience, and tenure. Another 
important determinant of wages is unemployment. A lot of studies indicate that unemployment 
reduces wages after reemployment (e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Beblo and Wolf, 
2002; Gregory and Juke, 2001; Strauß and Hillmert, 2011; Dijk and Folmer, 1999). Unfortunately, 
the research on the effects of human capital and unemployment on wages does not refer to 
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recalls. It neither analyzes the main effects of recalls nor interaction effects of recalls with human 
capital or unemployment. This article intends to close this gap by analyzing different returns on 
human capital and unemployment for recalled and non-recalled employees. Thus, it aims to 
identify mechanisms that change returns on assets after reemployment and explain wage 
inequalities in flexibilized labor markets. 
To control for other effects that determine wages, the following control variables are used: 
gender, industry, region, and firm size. Research on the gender wage gap mostly shows that men 
on average earn higher wages than women (Reimer, 2006). Moreover, industries reflect different 
labor market conditions which have different effects on wages (Carruth, Collier and Dickerson, 
2004; Benito, 2000). Furthermore, several studies identify regional effects on wages (Freguglia 
and Menezes, 2012; Pereira and Galego, 2011). For instance, in Germany there is a wage gap to 
the detriment of East Germans (Smolny and Kirbach, 2011; Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2005). 
Additionally, wages are also determined by different firm structures. The most important proxy 
which is available in many data sets is the firm size; it can be shown that wages rise with 
increasing firm size (Gerlach and Hübler, 1995; Hollister, 2004). 
 
2. Rent-seeking - a mechanism that changes reward structures 
According to Sørensen (2000), wage inequalities are generated by rent-seeking actions of 
employers and employees. Taking the theoretical competitive market equilibrium as a 
benchmark, values for productive resource (e.g. human capital) higher than the price that could 
be obtained in a market with perfect competition are called rents: “Rents are payments to assets 
that exceed the competitive price or the price sufficient to cover costs and therefore exceeding 
what is sufficient to bring about the employment of the asset” (Sørensen, 2000: 1536). When 
wage differentials are analyzed with this approach, the structural distributional mechanisms that 
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generate rents have to be examined. Causal explanation of wage inequalities is achieved by 
identifying institutionalized distributional mechanisms that explain how rents emerge and by 
identifying the activities undertaken by the different actors in the labor market to change them.  
 
Rent-seeking as a mechanism that generates inequality is based on the following assumptions:  
a. Actors usually depend on other actors and their assets; the value of an asset under their 
control can only be realized by entering into a social relationship. 
Employees need a job to make use of their human capital to produce income. Likewise, 
employers rely on people with those abilities needed to produce certain products or services. 
This interdependence implies that actors have to enter into a social relationship to use their 
resources to their mutual benefit — otherwise their assets cannot produce any economic 
gain. However, this does not necessarily mean that their mutual benefit is divided equally.  
b. Actors have a general interest in maximizing and preserving returns on their assets. While 
seeking to generate and protect their own rents, they try to destroy or diminish the rents of 
their counterparts.   
According to Sørensen (2000), the source of inequality resides in relations between actors. 
Due to the interdependent nature of an employment relationship, employees’ rents are 
losses to employers and vice versa. Although a disadvantaged actor who is nevertheless able 
to enter into a productive relationship still realizes an economic return on his or her assets, 
the potential gain is reduced by the rent of the other. Thus, rent-seeking actors are 
interested in changing the distributional mechanism that produces advantages for others.  
c. Actors differ in their bargaining power, which depends on their control over rent-producing 
assets and their ability to constitute or protect their property rights to returns on their 
assets. 
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The value of an asset is induced by assessing its productive use in a market situation. Rents 
can be realized if someone else needs a resource a person controls and, additionally, this 
resource is in restricted supply. Under these conditions, the other actor is willing to accept a 
decrease in his/her potential gains in order to realize a return on his/her asset. Furthermore, 
the distribution of returns is restricted by institutionalized property rights that are socially 
accepted. In general, there are two ways to realize a rent: either by getting access to rent-
producing assets or by changing property rights to returns on productive resources.  
 
If wage differentials are analyzed using Sørensen’s approach — that builds upon rent-seeking — 
the structural distributional mechanisms that generate rents and activities undertaken to change 
them have to be identified. According to Sørensen, composite rents and monopoly rents reflect 
different rent-producing mechanisms. Below, options for rent-seeking action that redistribute 
wage inequalities are explored in order to derive hypotheses about wage differentials after 
reemployment.  
 
Social closure in firms: composite rents for company-specific human capital 
If two assets are so specifically attuned to one another that their individual benefit depends 
greatly on the other, a composite rent emerges. Characteristically, this rent disappears if a certain 
social relationship is dissolved, because the rent requires a certain match. In transaction cost 
theory, this characteristic is called asset-specificity (Williamson, 1981: 555). Human asset 
specificity (firm- or job-specific human capital) that is able to produce a rent and higher wages is 
contingent on specific job situations. As a consequence, this human capital is not employable in 
alternative jobs and so loses its rent-producing potential. While employees reduce their wages in 
alternative jobs because of these forgone rents, employers lose their investments in the 
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emergence of firm-specific capital (e.g. costs of on-the-job-training). Therefore, re-contracting can 
be beneficial for both. Employers may be willing to reward former employees who waited for a 
recall by increasing their rewards for firm-specific human capital (tenure). Likewise, a rent-seeking 
employer could try to capture a part of the employee’s composite rent by dismissing and recalling 
him or her. This is beneficial if this action reduces the employee’s property rights to returns, so 
that he/she gains less than without being dismissed. Transaction cost theory deals with this 
option in terms of hold-up strategies (Klein, 1980).  
 
Institutionalized social closure in the labor market: monopoly rents from credentials 
Monopoly rents reduce competition by restricting the supply of monopolized resources to owners 
of monopoly rights. Hence, this rent-producing structural distributional mechanism is a form of 
social closure that creates and protects benefits for the in-group and prevents access to rents for 
outsiders. Wage differentials are produced by monopolized assets such as certain credentials. 
Rent-seeking employees strive to sustain or increase their property rights on returns to 
credentials. Thus, they prefer job offers that guarantee or enhance this rent.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
Employers and employees both profit from recalls, because recalls reduce transaction costs for 
both (Hense, Edler and Liebig, 2012). Additionally, recalls sustain composite rents due to firm-
specific human capital. Nevertheless, employees alone bear the financial risk of not being recalled 
and the income loss because of the dismissal, while the employer saves wage expenditures during 
the time the employee is outside the firm. Thus, economic gains and financial risks are not 
redistributed equally. Therefore, it is assumed that firms have to offer some incentives such as 
higher rewards for human capital to convince employees to wait for recalls. Otherwise a rent-
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seeking person would try to find a new job shortly after leaving their former employer in order to 
avoid income losses due to unemployment. This especially applies to employees who have good 
chances of finding alternative employment due to high credentials. 
The following hypotheses are derived from the theory of rent-production and the empirical 
findings on wage differentials:  
1. Valorization of human asset-specific capital: Wage differentials between recalled and non-
recalled people are supposed to be generated by different rewards to tenure. As employers 
benefit from the firm-specific capital of former employees it is assumed that they will offer 
higher income returns to tenure for recalled employees. This sustains composite rents for 
employers and employees. 
2. Valorization of human asset-unspecific capital: Wage differentials between recalled and non-
recalled people are assumed to be also produced by different rewards to credentials and 
work experience. These are higher for recalled employees in order to provide an incentive 
that they would not receive if they would decide to find another employer. Therefore, it is 
assumed that recalled employees gain higher monopoly rents due to credentials and work 
experience. 
3. Reduced devaluation of wages due to unemployment: Wage differentials between dismissed 
and continuously employed employees are induced by unemployment. Nevertheless, the 
losses in income for recalled and non-recalled employees in comparison to people who 
stayed employed are said to be different. It is assumed that recalled employees suffer less 
from unemployment than employees who changed their employer because composite rents 
can partly be retained and employer provide an incentive to wait for a recall. 
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4. Data 
For our analysis we used a sample of integrated labor market biographies (SIAB) provided by the 
Institute of Employment Research (IAB). The data covers the time period 1975 to 2008. It 
comprises a 2 percent random sample of administrative social security records in Germany and 
includes information contributed to the social security system. The sample is restricted to full-
time workers between 18 and 65 years. We exclude working interruptions due to maternity 
leaves applying an approximation by Schöneberg (2009). Moreover, employees who entered the 
labor market before 1975 are dropped to avoid left censoring. In total 6,459,378 observations 
remain.  
Our dependent variable is the logarithmized daily income of an employee (in Euro). The data 
provide the precise earnings of the employees if these are below the top social security 
contribution threshold. To counter this censoring, we imputed the wages above the income 
threshold as suggested by Gartner (2005). The definition of recall on which the analysis is based is 
that a worker is dismissed, experiences a period of unemployment of at least 31 days, and is 
reemployed by the former firm. Our analysis also includes the following independent variables 
that are supposed to be altered by recalls: Time spent in unemployment before an employee is 
reemployed by the former or another employer is measured in years. Indicators for human capital 
are formal education, work experience, and tenure. Formal education is coded into three groups: 
(1) Low-qualified employees who did not complete formal education or vocational training, (2) 
medium-qualified employees with a secondary or intermediate school leaving certificate and 
completed vocational training or an upper secondary school leaving certificate with and without 
completed vocational training, and (3) highly-qualified employees who graduated a university of 
applied science or a college or university. Work experience is defined by the time an employee 
spends in the labor market (without periods of unemployment) in years. Tenure stands for firm-
specific work experience. Thus, tenure encompasses the work-place specific work experience 
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before and after the displacement in the same firm. The descriptive statistics for these and the 
control variables are presented in the table 3 in the appendix.  
 
5. Multivariate Results 
The results (see table 1) are consistent across models, supporting a causal interpretation of the 
effects because the coefficients of the fixed- (fe) and random- effects (re) panel models are similar 
and do not lead to different conclusions. Thus the robust Hausman test, which favors the fixed 
effects model due to little endogeneity (with a correlation of 0.04 between the individual specific 
error term and regressors), remains without consequences for the interpretation. Models 1 (re) 
and 2 (fe) show the results for the main effects and will be interpreted first. Models 3 (re) and 4 
(fe) add interaction effects in order to analyze different rewards to recalled and non-recalled 
employees assumed by the hypotheses. These results, and their conclusions as regards the 
hypotheses, are then discussed.  
First, the negative coefficients of the two indicators for discontinuous employment (recall, 
unemployment duration) show that discontinuity results in income losses. The negative 
coefficient of recalls in models 1 and 2 indicates an income loss caused by a recall. The same 
applies to the negative main effect of unemployment duration, which causes income losses for all 
employees who entered into unemployment. Thus, employers are able to increase their rents by 
temporary layoffs. Second, the main effects of the three indicators measuring different types of 
human capital confirm the findings found in various studies: According to the human capital 
theory, wages increase with increasing credentials. This means that employees with medium 
formal education earn more than less qualified employees, and highly qualified employees earn 
most compared to the reference category of low qualified employees. Moreover, each additional 
year of work experience and tenure is remunerated by an increase in wages, whereas the 
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remuneration for work experience is more substantial and displays a diminishing marginal utility 
indicated by the negative effect of the squared work experience. The control variables, whose 
effects are not the focus of this analysis but are needed to control for additional effects on wages, 
are: gender, firm size, a dummy variable for East and West Germany, and industry. The results 
indicate that earnings are higher for men than for women and also increase with increasing firm 
size. Moreover, wages are higher in West than in East Germany. Compared to the reference 
category for industry (economic and household services) wages are mostly higher in other 
sectors.  
The main effects models only prepare the ground for the analysis and interpretation of 
models 3 and 4, which are important to test the hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that 
recalled employees gain higher returns to tenure than non-recalled employees. This is supported 
by the positive interaction effect of tenure and recall: Whereas each additional year of tenure 
increases the wages of non-recalled employees by about 0.5%, the increase for recalled 
employees is about 1.1%. This shows that recalled employees receive higher remuneration for 
tenure and are able to increase their composite rent for human asset specificity. The second 
hypothesis assumes that returns to human asset-unspecific capital (formal education and work 
experience) are also higher for recalled employees than for non-recalled employees. This is 
supported by the interaction effects of formal education and recall (see table 2), because wage 
increases are consistently higher for recalls—and employees with the highest credentials are 
rewarded most if they wait for a recall. The second hypothesis is not supported by the interaction 
effect of work experience and recall as the wage returns to work experience are about 2% lower 
for recalled persons than for non-recalled persons. Thus, recalled employees are able to increase 
their monopoly rents for formal education, but they lose rents for work experience. In contrast, 
employees who move to another employer are able to increase their rents from work experience. 
The third hypothesis, which states that the unemployment effect of recalled employees is lower 
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than the unemployment effect for people who found another employer, is not supported. The 
interaction term of unemployment duration and recall is statistically insignificant. This indicates 
that growing unemployment duration leads to equal wage losses for recalled employees and 
other discontinuously employed workers. Thus, employers only offer incentives for human capital 
and tenure and reduce the wages of recalled employees similarly to other people with 
unemployment spells. The effects of the control variables remain stable.  
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Table 1: Determinants of daily wages (log-linear random- and fixed-effects panel models) 
 RE FE RE (incl. interaction) FE (incl. interaction) 
Recall (ref.: no recall) -.066*** (.001) -.065*** (.001) .046*** (.003) .045*** (.003) 
Formal education (ref.: low formal education)         
Medium formal education .113*** (.001) .081*** (.002) .115*** (.001) .083*** (.002) 
Medium formal education * recall     -.021*** (.002) -.016*** (.002) 
Higher formal education .507*** (.003) .380*** (.004) .507*** (.003) .379*** (.004) 
Higher formal education * recall           .014**  (.005) .020*** (.005) 
Work experience .074*** (.000) .075*** (.000) .076*** (.000) .077*** (.000) 
Work experience * recall     -.020*** (.000) -.020*** (.000) 
Work experience ² -.001*** (.000) -.001*** (.000) -.001*** (.000) -.001*** (.000) 
Work experience ² * recall     .000*** (.000) .000*** (.000) 
Tenure .006*** (.000) .005*** (.000) .005*** (.000) .004*** (.000) 
Tenure * recall     .006*** (.000) .008*** (.000) 
Duration of unemployment -.003*** (.000) -.003*** (.000) -.003*** (.000) -.003*** (.000) 
Duration of unemployment * recall     -.001 (.001) -.000 (.001) 
Man (ref.: woman) .294*** (.001)   .291*** (.001)   
West Germany (ref.: East Germany) .140*** (.004) .185*** (.007) .139*** (.004) .185*** (.007) 
Firm size .000*** (.000) .000*** (.000) .000*** (.000) .000*** (.000) 
Sector (ref.: Economic and household services)         
Agriculture, energy, mining .066*** (.004) .087*** (.004) .066*** (.004) .088*** (.004) 
Basic Production, production of goods .188*** (.002) .196*** (.003) .188*** (.002) .197*** (.003) 
Mechanical engineering, steel processing, 
Vehicle and equipment construction .167*** (.002) .174*** (.002) .168*** (.002) .175*** (.002) 
Consumer goods, food and luxury foods .102*** (.002) .124*** (.002) .102*** (.002) .125*** (.002) 
Construction .106*** (.002) .125*** (.003) .106*** (.002) . 125*** (.003) 
Wholesale trade and retail .062*** (.002) .079*** (.002) .061*** (.002) . 079*** (.002) 
Transport, storage and communication .066*** (.003) .070*** (.003) .067*** (.003) . 071*** (.003) 
Home services, hospital, education -.180*** (.012) -.153*** (.013) -.180*** (.012) -.153*** (.013) 
(Street) cleaning, organizations .168*** (.003) .153*** (.003) .167*** (.003) .152*** (.003) 
Public administration, social security .048*** (.003) .056*** (.004) .048*** (.004) .056*** (.004) 
Constant  3.046*** (.004) 3.199*** (.007) 3.037*** (.004) 3.188*** (.007) 
R²    within .4276 .4290 .4290 .4304 
    between .3982 .3150 .3982 .3162 
    overall .4217 .3475 .4222 .3488 
Number of obs 6,459,378 6,459,378 6,459,378 6,459,378 
Number of groups 640,063 640,063 640,063 640,063 
Prob >F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Remarks: *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001, cluster-robust standard errors in brackets, RE: Random effects panel model, FE: Fixed effects panel model 
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Table 2: The effect of formal education on income for recalled and non-recalled employees 
 Low formal education Medium formal education High formal education 
RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Recall .046 .045 .140 .112 .567 .443 
No Recall 0 0 .115 .083 .507 .379 
 
Long-term earning effects  
Figure 1 plots the long-term earning effects of recalls compared to (1) employees with the same 
period of unemployment that are reemployed by another firm and to (2) continuously employed 
workers. The long dashed line illustrates continuously employed workers over eighteen years of 
work experience which is identical equal to eighteen years of tenure. If the employees become 
unemployed after five years, stay unemployed for one year and are reemployed in a new firm 
their income development is reflected by the course of the short-dashed line. For employees who 
instead are recalled to their previous firm, the solid line maps the course of their income 
development. 
The positive slope of all three groups shows that each additional year of work experience 
and tenure leads to positive wage growth. In the main, the figure illustrates the strong negative 
effect of displacement on income. But if employees are recalled, they receive slightly higher 
wages directly after reentry into the labor market than employees who enter a new job. This 
means that the wage loss through displacement is weakened by recalls. And the results of the 
regression analysis demonstrate that this is due to returns on tenure and not due to a different 
assessment of unemployment spells for recalled and non-recalled employees. Moreover, the 
figure demonstrates that wages are not permanently higher for recalled employees. After about 
2.18 years of reemployment, the line mapping wage growth of recalled employees and the line 
mapping wage growth of workers employed in a new job cross one another. This indicates that 
wage growth of recalled employees is lower and that a labor relationship with a previous 
employer leads to lower marginal utility with each additional year after reentry into the labor 
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market. The regression results provide the following explanation for this effect: The returns to 
work experience are lower for recalled employees. Overall it can be said that there are short-term 
income benefits for recalled employees compared to employees reemployed in a new job 
because the former are able to increase rents for tenure. But in the long-term, income 
development for employees in new jobs is better because they increase rents for work experience 
which counts more than tenure. Nevertheless, the negative effect of displacement on income 
applies to both. In the case of a future recall, this increases the employer’s rents.  
Figure 1: Wage growth depending on work experience, tenure, and unemployment (FE model) 
 
Continuous: Wage growth for each additional year of work experience and tenure of 
continuously employed workers  
Recall:  Wage growth for each additional year of work experience and tenure of recalled 
employees after 1 year of unemployment, 5 years of work experience and 5 years 
of tenure  
New job:  Wage growth for each additional year of work experience and tenure of employees 
in new jobs after 1 year of unemployment and 5 years of work experience and 0 
years of tenure 
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6. Summary and discussion 
This article analyzes and explains wage inequalities in flexibilized labor markets generated by 
discontinuous employment and different returns to human capital. The analysis compares wage 
differentials of employees who were recalled with employees who found another employer, or 
stayed in the same employment relationship. We identify rent-seeking as an inequality-generating 
mechanism and show that rent-seeking reemployment decisions of employers and employees 
result in wage inequalities.   
Employees strive for continuous employment to maintain and increase income returns to 
human capital, and thus gain the highest wages. Rent-seeking employers are interested in 
obtaining benefits by changing the distributional mechanisms that produce income benefits but 
do not provide equal increases of employee’s rents. Thus, a rent-seeking employer could try to 
capture a part of the employee’s composite rent by dismissing and recalling him or her. This is 
beneficial because this action reduces the employee’s property rights to returns, so that he/she 
gains less than without being dismissed. Although employers provide higher returns on tenure 
and formal education after a recall, the wages of employees are effectively reduced through a 
recall. This is because employees lose income due to unemployment and they never recover the 
income they could have gained if they had not have been dismissed. Hence, an employer changes 
the structural distributional mechanism of composite rents by reducing the employee’s share 
through a recall. In sum, employers gain advantages by using recalls as an instrument for 
monetary flexibility by means of external-numerical flexibility (dismissal and re-hire). As a 
consequence, employers reduce total labor costs during the time of the temporary layoff as well 
as individual wages of reemployed people. They partly redistribute these gains by paying higher 
returns on tenure and credentials. Therefore, former employees get privileged access to job 
openings, but get fewer rewards compared to those who remained in the company. Accordingly, 
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employees’ property rights to returns are reduced by means of the interruption of the 
employment relationship. 
Nevertheless, workers who are employed discontinuously are able to increase returns to 
credentials and tenure through recalls and receive higher wages shortly after reemployment than 
employees who moved to another employer. In contrast, employees who were reemployed in a 
new firm suffer higher short-term wage losses than recalled employees, but are able to gain long-
term income benefits by increasing returns to work experience. Thus, different reemployment 
decisions explain the short-term advantages of recalled people and the long-term advantages of 
employees who found another employer. Nevertheless, neither of them is able to recover his/her 
former income benefits as compared to those who were employed continuously. Hence, their 
wage losses reflect equally negative effects of unemployment on income. In sum, reemployment 
decisions modify property rights to returns on work experience to the advantage of non-recalled 
employees, while making a recall decision changes property rights to returns on credentials and 
tenure to the advantage of returnees. Thus, dismissed employees who were recalled best protect 
and increase monopoly rents from credentials and composite rents from firm-specific human 
capital. Nevertheless, people who found another employer benefit in the long run. A theoretical 
explanation for this effect could be the emergence of another type of composite rent that is 
based on the employee’s ability to adapt human capital to alternative conditions and the 
employer’s potential to provide new learning opportunities. Firms can enhance their 
competitiveness in the commodity market by opening some job positions to new job applicants. 
Similarly, employees can gain competitiveness in the external labor market by changing 
employers. Therefore, the rents gained by social closure of employment relationships may result 
in losses of other composite rents obtained by different experiences and different matches. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min
. 
Max. 
Daily income 67.403 42.760 0 1306.28 
Recall (ref. no recall) 0.160 - 0 1 
Formal education (ref. low)     
Medium  0.710 - 0 1 
Higher  0.107 - 0 1 
Work experience  8.704 6.678 0 33.0 
Tenure  4.072 5.08 0 33.0 
Duration of unemployment  0.397 1.319 0 31.915 
Gender (ref. woman)     
Man 0.611 - 0 1 
Germany (ref. East Germany)     
West Germany 0.974 - 0 1 
Firm size 93.962 420.983 0 6286.9 
Sector (ref. Economic and household services)     
Agriculture, energy, mining 0.028 - 0 1 
Basic production, production of goods 0.061 - 0 1 
Mechanical engineering, steel processing, 
vehicle and equipment construction 0.178 - 0 1 
Consumer goods, food  0.096 - 0 1 
Construction  0.081 - 0 1 
Wholesale trade, retail  0.144 - 0 1 
Transport, storage, and communication 0.054 - 0 1 
Home services, hospital, education 0.004 - 0 1 
(Street) cleaning, organizations 0.089 - 0 1 
Public administration, social security 0.053 - 0 1 
 
Number of observations         6,459,378 
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